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Summary 
Although the objectives of the Energiewende (energy transition) are 
broadly accepted in Germany, the practical ways of achieving them 
remain highly contentious. In particular, the question of whether and 
how security of supply can be guaranteed over the course of this 
profound transformation of the energy system is currently the subject 
of controversy in the scientific and public debate. Recently, calls for 
additional payments to power plant operators for providing generation 
capacity have grown increasingly loud. But the introduction of capacity 
payments of this sort could have far-reaching consequences for the 
future organisation of Germany’s electricity supply. Therefore the 
political decision on this issue – which is scheduled for this year – 
should not be made without a sound scientific analysis. 
Basically, measures aimed at guaranteeing security of supply must 
address the possible causes of capacity shortages as broadly as 
possible. When designing such measures, besides security of supply, 
additional objectives such as cost-effectiveness and the environ-
mental and social acceptability of electricity supply should also be 
taken into account. Capacity payments only partially meet these 
requirements. Moreover, once introduced they are difficult to adapt, or 
revise even, to suit changing framework conditions. This is particularly 
problematic in view of the current lack of clear evidence for future 
security of supply problems. Therefore introducing capacity payments 
at this point in time would not appear to be constructive. It would make 
more sense to introduce instead a mix of measures which would 
strengthen the electricity market, create conditions for feeding in 
electricity from renewable energy sources as and when required, and 
set incentives for the expansion of grid capacity, storage systems and 
demand side management. Should security of supply still appear 
uncertain under these changed framework conditions, the introduction 
of a strategic reserve, which would be held by the regulatory authority 
or the transmission system operator, is recommended – not, however, 
the creation of an entirely new, additional market segment in the form 
of a capacity market. 
On the basis of its programme of integrated research on the energy 
transition, researchers from the Helmholtz Alliance ENERGY-TRANS 
issue their opinion on important controversial questions in the current 
energy transition debate and identify fundamental challenges involved 
in designing sustainable energy transition policy. A detailed ENERGY-
TRANS Discussion Paper forms the basis for this article.2 
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The Discourse on Security of Supply 
in Germany 
 1. Recently, fears that a secure supply of electricity might be 
jeopardized in the course of the German Energiewende have 
increasingly been expressed.3 The reasons for these concerns are 
varied. On the one hand, the share of intermittent renewable energy 
sources (wind and solar) has been increasing steadily.4 As a 
consequence, the challenge of balancing not only fluctuating demand 
but also a partly volatile energy supply with flexible generation 
capacities has been moving increasingly center stage. On the other 
hand, wholesale prices on the electricity exchanges have fallen in the 
past few years for a variety of reasons.5 As a result, operators of 
fossil-fired power plants find themselves facing problems of 
profitability. Announcements by power plant operators proclaiming 
that conventional power plants are to be decommissioned or not built 
at all in the short-to-medium term bear testimony to this development.6 
Insufficient investment in conventional reserve power plants could – 
some fear – lead to growing supply bottlenecks in Germany, at the 
latest with the final shut down of the last nuclear power plants in 2022. 
Demands for Capacity Payments  
and the Political Agenda 
 2. The introduction of capacity payments for operators of conventional 
power plants as a way of ensuring the future supply of electricity is 
currently being debated intensely and controversially.7 Under such a 
scheme, power plant operators would not only be remunerated for the 
electricity they produce (in kilowatt hours) – as is the case at the 
moment – they would also receive an additional payment for the 
guaranteed capacity they provide (in watts).8 The goal of these 
payments would be to attain a certain level of guaranteed generation 
capacity. They could also contribute to preventing decommissioning of 
existing conventional power plants and provide incentives for building 
new power plants. In principle, storage system operators and 
electricity consumers who are willing to temporarily cut back on their 
consumption could conceivably also profit from such payments. In the 
last two years, various proposals have been drawn up on precisely 
how the design of such a capacity mechanism for Germany should 
look.9 The spectrum ranges from the provision of sufficient reserve 
capacities via the regulatory authority or transmission system operator 
(strategic reserve) through to more competitively organised 
mechanisms such as a capacity market. For the purpose of the 
discussion it is therefore important to distinguish whether the 
introduction of a capacity mechanism in general (of whatever design) 
or a specific capacity market is under consideration. What can be said 
is that, ultimately, all of the proposed options for a state-initiated 
capacity mechanism envisage additional payments to power plant 
operators. In the process, the debate about capacity payments was 
strongly pushed forward by commissioned reports. At the same time 
the topic was placed on the political agenda. For instance, in the 
coalition agreement, Germany’s governing parties declared their 
intention to “develop a capacity mechanism in the medium term”.10 
The Green Paper entitled “An Electricity Market for Germany’s Energy 
Transition” published by the German Federal Ministry for Economic 
Affairs and Energy in October 2014 is aimed at launching a new 
consultation process in the run-up to the final decision, which is due in 
the course of this year.11 Yet, even in the Green Paper, the 
introduction of a capacity mechanism in the form of a capacity reserve 
is deemed necessary, at least for a transition period. However, this 
prior assumption has attracted criticism from scientists and experts.12 
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Current Calls for Capacity Payments 
are Premature 
 3. Basically, the introduction of capacity payments would have far-
reaching implications for the future organisation of Germany’s energy 
supply. Decisions to invest in or retire power plants would no longer 
be (alone) steered by prices on the electricity exchange, which signal 
scarcities and surpluses in the market. Instead decisions would be 
influenced significantly by additional, state-administered capacity 
payments. The amount of these payments would depend more or less 
directly on the politically set framework, such as the specified total 
capacity required. Thus capacity payments create a new area for 
government intervention – and possibly also for disincentives set by 
the state. Furthermore, capacity mechanisms also give rise to 
fundamental concerns about regulatory policy: For instance, they 
open up additional possibilities for the state to intervene in the spatial 
distribution and composition of Germany’s power plant fleet. In 
addition, experience shows that payment flows, once created by 
capacity mechanisms – which ultimately can be understood as 
subsidies13 – can only be taken back with difficulty, even if they lose 
their potential legitimacy for the energy sector in the future. Hence the 
introduction of capacity payments should be carefully considered. 
Lack of Evidence Pointing to a Need 
for Capacity Payments 
 4. In the context of the discussion on capacity mechanisms, many 
questions that are crucial to the evaluation of proposals for further 
developing the current design of the electricity market in a meaningful 
way have so far remained unanswered. These questions relate not 
only to the existence of security of supply problems and their 
underlying causes but also to alternative solution concepts and their 
respective suitability: 
 Will security of supply really be jeopardised in the future if the 
current regulatory conditions remain in place – or are the 
current (threatened) retirements of power plants merely the 
right economic response to existing excess capacity? 
 To which market and regulatory failures can potential capacity 
constraints be attributed? Is security of supply really 
threatened primarily by the transformation in the energy 
sector? 
 To what extent can capacity mechanisms adequately address 
the various conceivable causes of possible capacity 
constraints? And, are they suitable to stimulate the required 
flexible capacities in a targeted manner? 
 What negative side effects can capacity payments have? How 
do they fit at all into an electricity market that is currently taking 
leave of purely state-administered payments for renewable 
energy sources? 
Then there is also the question as to the potential alternative options 
to capacity payments. It becomes clear that so far there has been no 
satisfactory problem diagnosis, nor has the suitability of the presented 
proposals for capacity payments been sufficiently examined. Under 
these circumstances the introduction of capacity payments at the 
present time appears over-hasty and ill-considered. Further scientific 
analyses of the need for capacity payments, particularly also in the 
German context – as recently set in motion by the Federal Economics 
Ministry’s Green Paper – are crucial in order to arrive at policy 
recommendations that will be sustainable in the long term. 
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Security of Supply Will Not Be 
Accomplished Alone by Building 
Power Plants 
5. The essential starting point for any analysis of capacity payments is 
a comprehensive, systematic understanding of security of supply. In 
this light, security of supply should be understood as the permanent 
balancing of electricity supply and demand, taking into account all 
possible options for action of market actors. Security of supply cannot 
be ensured through the construction or continued operation of fossil-
fired power plants alone. In fact, in principle, all other actors in the 
electricity supply system – operators of renewable energy 
installations, grids and storage systems as well as energy consumers 
– can contribute to security of supply as well.14 In this context, security 
of supply does not merely mean that the maximum expected energy 
consumption (taking the possible reduction and flexibilisation potential 
of demand into account) must be covered by guaranteed generation. 
Additionally, sufficient flexible capacities must be available in order to 
be able to respond to short-term, unexpected disruptions in the 
system so that grid stability can be guaranteed, ideally at all times.15 
Security of Supply Risks Should Not 
Be Minimised At All Costs 
 6. A reasonable discussion of measures aimed at ensuring security of 
supply must consider all societally relevant criteria and objectives. 
Unquestionably, a certain level of security of supply should be 
guaranteed at the lowest possible cost. Bearing that in mind, the 
regulatory framework must be chosen in such a way that, from an 
economic perspective, the most efficient investments are made – 
regardless of whether they relate to the construction of new power 
plants, the expansion of storage systems and grids, demand side 
management, or a mixture of those options. Furthermore, the question 
of who would have to shoulder the potential additional costs of greater 
security of supply has to be examined. What additional burdens would 
be placed on private households? Would the social debate on energy 
prices be further intensified? To what extent would the 
competitiveness of companies be damaged by additional energy 
costs? And, last but not least, measures aimed at ensuring security of 
supply must be compatible with the goals of climate protection, the 
expansion of renewable energy sources, and energy efficiency. 
Possible synergies and conflicts between these various goals must 
therefore be sufficiently understood and taken into consideration. 
No Evidence So Far for Short- or 
Medium-Term Capacity Shortages 
 7. In principle, the electricity market in its current form rewards in-
vestments in new power plants and storage systems as well as 
electricity demand adjustments. The market for balancing energy 
which ensures short-term stability of the system also rewards 
particularly flexible options for balancing supply and demand. 
Theoretically, long-term signals for the construction of power plants or 
storage systems are sent by the forward markets.16 Only the network 
infrastructure, which by its economic nature represents a natural 
monopoly, cannot be managed efficiently via the electricity market. 
The functionality of the electricity market can, however, be additionally 
impaired for various reasons. Market power, the short-term pursuit of 
returns on investments or imperfect handling of market uncertainties 
can affect the efficiency of market actors’ decisions. Also, under the 
current framework conditions, electricity consumers only respond to 
short-term changes in price signals of electricity scarcity to a limited 
degree, especially since such changes are frequently not even passed 
on to the end-user. In addition, the regulatory conditions – such as 
politically determined price ceilings or lengthy authorisation 
procedures – can put a brake on investments.17 State support for 
renewable energy sources can exacerbate some of these problems 
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(see point 12 below): Support for renewables contributes to 
decreasing electricity exchange prices and revenues for the operators 
of conventional power plants.18 At the same time, support primarily 
aimed at bringing intermittent energy sources (wind, solar) to the 
market, increases the volatility of energy prices and so contributes to 
investment uncertainty.19 Nevertheless, due to the lack of 
unambiguous empirical evidence, it remains unclear whether and to 
what extent security of supply might be compromised in the future. 
Typical indicators suggest that, in principle, there is enough capacity 
available to cover the maximum expected demand for electricity. Thus 
the power account balance, i. e. the balance between (guaranteed) 
power plant capacity and the maximum demand for electricity, is 
positive at the moment and probably will be for the coming years.20 
What’s more, other European countries have overcapacities and 
Germany could import more electricity from them. However, some 
constraints may exist in the short-term balancing of electricity supply 
and demand, that is, in the flexibility of the electricity supply system. 
This is perhaps indicated by the Federal Network Agency’s prohibition 
on power plant shut-downs and the call-up of the grid reserve for 
redispatch purposes.21 Nevertheless these measures are more likely 
an expression of grid constraints than of insufficient generation 
capacity.22 
It Is Doubtful That Capacity Payments 
Can Help to Solve the Problem 
 8. Capacity payments, when adequately designed, can without doubt 
serve as an effective means of achieving a certain level of guaranteed 
capacity. Other countries’ experiences with capacity mechanisms are 
nonetheless quite conflicting.23 Yet it is less clear whether capacity 
payments can activate precisely those options that are flexible enough 
to balance supply and demand – such as flexible fossil-fired power 
plants, storage systems or demand side management. Additional pre-
qualification requirements for the granting of capacity payments – as 
envisaged by some but by no means all of the proposed models – 
must be established to ensure this. 
9. Capacity mechanisms, as simple, state-administered payments 
without a time limit, also give rise to regulatory policy issues. For 
instance, it remains to be clarified how capacity payments should be 
evaluated in respect of the equally relevant energy policy objectives of 
economic efficiency and environmental and social acceptability. 
Essentially, capacity payments only address the actual causes of 
possible security of supply problems to a limited extent – that is, the 
various existing market and regulatory deficits (see point 7 above). 
Moreover, in the future, capacity payments – particularly when 
institutionalised through an entirely new “capacity market” – can only 
be adjusted to changing circumstances, or even fundamentally 
revised, with difficulty. After all, it is to be expected that the future 
recipients of payments would have a vested interest in maintaining the 
payments and that they would assert their interest politically. The 
distributional implications of capacity payments also remain unclear: if 
they result in rising energy prices, capacity payments will give rise to a 
substantial redistribution of income from the electricity consumers to 
the electricity suppliers operating the power plants.24 Social and 
industrial policy concerns have frequently been expressed in 
connection with the expected price effects caused by the promotion of 
renewable energy sources. Such concerns must therefore also be 
taken into consideration in the case of novel and tendentially unlimited 
payments for conventional power plant capacities. Ultimately, we also 
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have to ask whether new payments for existing fossil-fired installations 
would not essentially complicate the transition to a more sustainable 
electricity supply, which in the year 2050 is supposed to be based 
predominantly on renewable energy sources. After all, capacity 
payments would possibly incentivise the construction of new fossil-
fired power plants which would be in existence over several decades 
to come. This applies in particular if the EU emissions trading scheme 
is not sufficiently strengthened. 
Strengthening of Existing Structures 
Should Have Priority 
 10. At the same time, there are alternatives to capacity payments. 
Security of supply can also be guaranteed through a mix of 
instruments. For example, measures aimed at strengthening the 
existing electricity market could make a contribution. Possible options 
range from the completion of deregulation of the electricity market (in 
order to contain market power and make price ceilings redundant) to 
regionally differentiated wholesale prices (for better signalling of 
regional capacity constraints) right through to accelerated 
authorisation procedures for building new infrastructure.25 In the area 
of energy transformation policy, incentives for a more demand-based 
feed-in of electricity from renewable energy sources could be set.26 A 
fundamental strengthening of the emissions trading scheme would 
also shift investment decisions in the power plant sector towards gas 
power plants with lower emission and greater flexibility. In addition, 
targeted measures could set incentives for the construction and 
operation of grids, storage systems and demand side management. In 
this case, too, the imaginable portfolio is broad, ranging from 
adjustments to incentive regulation for networks through to support for 
technology and research relating to battery storage and smart grids.27 
11. From an economic perspective, a mix of instruments aimed at 
addressing the various causes of insufficient security of supply can 
lead to lower macroeconomic costs than fixed capacity payments. 
Furthermore, some of the instruments would also confer other 
advantages in addition to security of supply. For example, a tightening 
of the emissions trading scheme would also enhance the 
effectiveness of climate protection policy. The additional 
administrative burden of such a mix of instruments is likely to be 
limited: Many of the possible alternatives for ensuring security of 
supply have already been implemented and require strengthening and 
realignment more than anything else. But by nature such a mix of 
instruments is not without its problems. Given the high regulatory 
complexity involved, the combined measures must be carefully 
coordinated to complement each other. Moreover, the ultimate 
distribution effects in the mix of policy instruments are difficult to 
predict. And whether a combination of measures can actually be more 
flexibly adapted to changing framework conditions than centrally 
administered capacity payments is also questionable. 
The Energiewende Should Not Be 
Scapegoated for Potential Supply 
Constraints 
 12. The impression often arising from the current debate on security of 
supply is that potential problems can be attributed primarily to the 
Energiewende – that is, the promotion of renewable energy sources 
and the phase-out of nuclear power. Without a doubt, the increasing 
share of (intermittent) renewable energy sources, especially wind and 
solar energy, in electricity generation as a whole creates additional 
challenges for ensuring security of supply.28 Nevertheless, a 
differentiated look at the framework conditions under which the 
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electricity market operates today (see point 7 above) also shows that 
the Energiewende is just one of numerous causes of possible supply 
constraints. Many of the challenges mentioned (e.g. short-term profit 
maximisation under uncertainty or low demand response) would also 
arise without the energy transition. Furthermore, in the medium-term 
market actors will respond to the energy transition, even without state 
intervention, and will take measures conducive to ensuring security of 
supply. So, the support of renewable energy sources increases end 
consumer prices and therewith sets additional incentives for reducing 
electricity demand. When nuclear power plants are shut down, 
operating times and revenues for fossil-fired power plants go up in the 
medium term.29 Therefore, it is clear that adjustments, particularly to 
support schemes for renewable energy sources, have to be taken into 
consideration as a way of helping to secure supply in the long term. 
The Energiewende is not, however, the sole “scapegoat” for possible 
future supply constraints. And it would certainly not be prudent to put 
the Energiewende on the back burner in the interest of security of 
supply. 
An Intelligent Portfolio of Measures 
Instead of Capacity Payments  
for Fossil-Fired Power Plants 
 13. The debate on security of supply symbolises the complexity and 
manifold uncertainties associated with Germany’s Energiewende. 
Particularly under these circumstances, from a scientific perspective, it 
is important at this point not to make far-reaching and profound 
decisions such as introducing novel, permanent regulatory 
instruments in the absence of clear evidence. It would appear to make 
more sense to have a security of supply policy that stands on many 
legs. A portfolio of measures can help to tackle the diverse causes of 
possible capacity constraints in a more targeted and cost-effective 
manner. In doing so, given the complexity and uncertainty involved, it 
is important that the political process is designed to be as transparent 
and participatory as possible so that the perspectives of all the 
relevant actors – including those of electricity suppliers, grid and 
storage system operators, and, not least, energy consumers – can be 
given due consideration.30 In addition, the political instruments must 
be chosen such that they can be adapted to future changing 
framework conditions. For political reasons, this seems rather unlikely 
once capacity payments have been granted. 
Credible Political Commitment 
Needed 
 14. Admittedly, a political strategy aimed at ensuring security of supply 
without capacity payments can only work if policy makers can give 
credible assurances that a capacity mechanism will not be introduced 
in the foreseeable future. Otherwise a self-fulfilling prophecy 
threatens: in expectation of possible future capacity payments 
companies might see themselves incentivised to strategically hold off 
on investments and, with the announcement of power plant shut-
downs, create a political threat. Ultimately, even just the political 
prospect of a future possibility of a capacity mechanism would in the 
end make it politically inevitable due to this strategic withholding of 
investment.31 
A Strategic Reserve as a Risk Buffer?  15. It is the task of policy makers to evaluate the established un-
certainties with regard to ensuring the supply of electricity and to 
make decisions on this basis. Therefore, it would be politically 
legitimate if, following careful and transparent consideration, political 
decision makers were to conclude that additional capacity-building 
measures are essential to safeguard against possible supply 
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constraints. But in this case, given the current knowledge gaps, it 
would be crucial that the mechanism be selected in such a way that 
less rigid structures emerge in the future which – with better evidence 
of the performance capacity of conventional electricity markets and a 
clear understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of various 
measures – would be difficult to adjust. Therefore, if a decision in 
favour of capacity payments is made at political level, then efforts 
should be made to ensure a strategic, centrally administered capacity 
reserve (strategic reserve) as a short- and medium-term risk buffer. 
This approach could provide the required flexible capacities in a 
targeted manner. What is more, it could be reversed at any time. 
16. The Green Paper on the electricity market calls for a fundamental 
policy decision between an optimised “electricity market 2.0” 
embedded in a package of measures aimed at strengthening flexibility 
and securing supply on the one hand, and extra payments for 
conventional power plants in the sense of a capacity market on the 
other.32 Considering the various uncertainties, there is apparently 
more to be said for the first option at present. A package of measures 
could address the diverse causes of possible supply bottlenecks in a 
more targeted manner and at the same time take better account of the 
requirements of economic efficiency and environmental and social 
acceptability. The introduction of a strategic reserve can – depending 
on the political assessment of the threat to security of supply – be 
among the flanking measures accompanying the “electricity market 
2.0”. The short-term introduction of complex capacity markets for 
conventional power plants, on the other hand, would fail to address 
the root causes of supply bottlenecks, neglect important objectives of 
sustainable energy policy, and, in addition, lead to a specific 
predetermined solution that would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
revise in a regulatory environment that is on the whole uncertain. 
Therefore, based on our current knowledge, capacity markets of this 
kind are not recommended. 
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